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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (21 Mar 68) FOR OT RD 67X178

28 March 1968

AD 389132

**SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation AVRON, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period 9 - 27 June 1967 (U)**

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1. Subject report is forwarded as inclosure for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

**BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:**

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT  
APO San Francisco 96257

1. (U) REFERENCES.

- a. 9th Infantry Division OPORD 50-67, (Operation AKRON), 30 May 1967.
- b. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment OPORD 10-67 (Operation AKRON), 4 June 1967.
- c. Map Series L7014, Vietnam, Sheets 6330 L-III, 6430 L-IV

2. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION. 9th Infantry Division Operation AKRON, Jungle Clearing, Search and Destroy.

3. (U) DATES OF OPERATION. 090600H - 271653H June 1967.

4. (U) LOCATION. The area of operations was confined primarily to the HAT DICH SECRET ZONE in PHUOC TUY Province west of Interprovincial Route 2.

5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS.

a. Operation AKRON was controlled by Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division with 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) the participating headquarters. The reporting officer for this report is Colonel Roy W. Farley, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

b. Subordinate commanders during the operation were as follows:

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry - LTC Martin D. Howell  
3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry - LTC Arthur F. Cochran  
Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry - CPT Marvin L. Doerr  
Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry - MAJ Francis B. Martin  
37th Medical Company - CPT Dennis J. Blais  
919th Engineer Company - CPT Donald J. Crocker  
409th Radio Research Detachment - 1LT Frank Zachar  
541st Military Intelligence Detachment - MAJ Cornelius Gray  
17th Public Information Detachment - CPT Owen W. Ditchfield  
Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery - CPT Ralph P. Swofford III  
35th Ranger Battalion (III Corps - ARVN) - CPT Jared L. Bates, Advisor  
52nd Ranger Battalion (16th Inf Div - ARVN) - CPT Alexander P. Shine, Advisor

6. (C) GENERAL. Operation AKRON, controlled by Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division was initiated to seek out and destroy Viet Cong/NVA forces in the HAT DICH SECRET ZONE, and to conduct jungle clearing operations along the FIRESTONE, BRIMSTONE, and BLACKSTONE TRAILS.

a. Task Organization. Control of the operation was exercised by the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) attached. The regimental command post remained at the LONG GIAO Base Camp vicinity Y3439468. The initial task organization is indicated below:

Regimental Control:

GROUP 4  
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Air Cavalry Troop

37th Medical Company

919th Engineer Company

409th Radio Research Detachment (-)

541st Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron

3rd Squadron:

3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company

1 AVLB 15th Engineer Battalion

b. Artillery.

(1) Size of Forces:

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery - 105mm (T)

(2) Missions fired by supporting artillery were contact missions, harassment and interdiction (H&I), reconnaissance by fire and navigational.

(3) Concept of the Operation: The howitzer batteries organic to the regiment were used in direct support of their parent squadrons and in general support of maneuver elements participating in Operation AKRON. Howitzer Battery, 1st and 3rd Squadrons, initially supported operations from base camp positions. As forces maneuvered out of artillery range, Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron displaced and remained with the squadron command post. Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery became OPCON to the regiment in direct support of the 52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN); the battery displaced to CAM MY vicinity YSL692 in order to support operations in Area LION.

(4) The timeliness and effectiveness of artillery support was highly instrumental in inflicting maximum losses upon enemy forces and installations.

(5) During the period 8-27 June 1967, the following number of rounds were fired in support of ground operations:

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron	1992
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron	3659
Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery	<u>628</u>
Total Rounds Expended	6279

c. Engineer. Engineer support was provided the regiment by the 919th Engineer Company (Armored). One platoon was attached to the 3rd Squadron throughout the operation while the 2nd Platoon supported the 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) on the 16th and 17th of June for the purpose of VC base camp destruction. In support of the 3rd Squadron, fifteen mines were detected and either removed or destroyed; three expedient ford crossing sites were constructed and one expedient type timber bridge, Class 55, was constructed to replace an AVLB on the Firestone Trail.

During the early morning attack of 19 June, the 3rd Platoon suffered two KHA and twelve WHA out of the twenty-six men involved. This was due to their occupation of that portion of the perimeter bearing the brunt of the ground attack. All platoon vehicles received light or moderate damage with one vehicle alone taking sixty-three rounds of small arms and one RPO-2 round. Due to casualties and equipment damage, the 2nd Platoon relieved the 3rd Platoon on the 20th of June and continued support throughout the remainder of the operation. In support of the 35th ARVN Ranger Battalion.

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a demolition team from the 2nd Platoon was air-lifted in on the 16th and 17th of June by UH-1D. Their mission was the destruction of an extensive VC base camp consisting of over 175 bunkers with overhead cover and a connecting trench network. While involved with this mission, thirty-eight mortar rounds, three claymore mines and miscellaneous small arms ammunition were found and destroyed.

d. Chemical. No chemical munitions or riot control agents were employed during the operation.

### e. Army Aviation.

(1) General: The Regimental Air Cavalry Troop and Regimental Headquarters Aviation Section supported the operation with thirteen OH-23's; twelve UH-1D's; and nineteen UH-1C's. The OH-23's were flown a total of 552 hours, consumed 9,384 gallons of 115/145 fuel and transported 1,022 passengers. The UH-1C armed helicopters flew 633 hours, consumed 37,980 gallons of JP-4 fuel; fired 283,200 rounds 7.62mm, 906 rounds 2.75" and 4,675 rounds 40mm. Two structures were destroyed. The UH-1D helicopters were flown 421 hours, consumed 25,260 gallons of JP-4 fuel, transported 854 passengers, and carried 6.8 tons of cargo (.3 tons a day).

### (2) Employment:

#### NUMBER OF SORTIES

	Command & Control	Reconnaissance	Aerial Support & Reaction Force
OH-23	777	65	
UH-1C		42	711
UH-1D	152		
	Troop Lift	Cargo Lift	Casualty Evacuation
UH-1D	167	232	20

Total of 2,055 sorties flown in support of the operation.

### (3) Techniques:

Proven concepts were employed during this operation with no significant changes.

### (4) Maintenance:

	On Hand	Available
OH-23	13	9.8*
UH-1C	19	15.6
UH-1D	12	10.3

\* Low availability of OH-23's is due to a continuous loss of generators, and excessive time for arrival of replacement parts.

f. Air Force. Preliminary coordination was made with the 9th Infantry Division TACP. Since only two O-1 aircraft are available to the regiment, considerable scheduling difficulties were encountered; however the 9th Infantry Division did supplement the FAC resources of the regiment. In most instances the Blackhorse FAC were able to meet all of their commitments without requiring outside assistance. The TACP remained with the regimental TOC at LONG GIAO. No communications difficulties between the 3rd Squadron and the TACP were experienced, however much more efficient and responsive FAC service could have been provided if the 3rd Squadron would have operated within the FM radio capability of the O-1 aircraft. Under the present setup, if the 3rd Squadron desires FAC assistance they must switch to the FAC frequency. No problem exists in this vein; however if the FAC desires to contact the

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3rd Squadron and inform them of any targets or pending dangers he is not able to do so because of frequency limitations on FAC radios. The near proximity of this operation to LONG GIAO did not require continuous airborne FAC coverage during daylight hours. Full FAC coverage was provided by a combination of strip alert at LONG GIAO and airborne O-1 aircraft.

FAC and tactical fighter/bomber sorties flown in support of the 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation AKRON were as follows:

(1) Total O-1 Sorties - 90

- (a) Forward Air Control - 28 (72:35 hours)
- (b) Convoy Escort - 42 (100:55 hours)
- (c) Visual Reconnaissance - 18 (28:40 hours)
- (d) Maintenance - 2 (0:55 hours)

(2) Fighter/Bomber Support

- (a) Total strike aircraft missions - 43
- (b) Total strike aircraft sorties - 100
- (c) Immediate missions - 7 (10 sorties)
- (d) Preplanned missions - 36 (90 sorties)

(3) Size and Composition of Forces:

(a) Immediate Missions - by flight:

2 A1-H 16MK - 81  
 1 AC-47 21,000 7.62mm / 45 Flares  
 1 AC-45 / 54 Flares  
 1 AC-47 20,000 7.62mm / 30 Flares  
 1 AC-47 / 20 Flares  
 2 F-5 12MK - 82  
 2 F-100 8MK - 82 / 1200 20mm

(b) Preplanned missions - by flight:

2 F-100 8 MK-82 / 1600 20mm  
 3 F-100 6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP  
 3 F-100 8 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1600 20mm  
 2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1600 20mm  
 \*2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP  
 3 F-100 4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1500 20mm  
 2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP  
 3 F-4C 12 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2400 20mm  
 3 F-4C 12 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 3600 20mm  
 \*2 F-100 Ordnance Expanded UNKNOWN  
 \*1 B-57 3 MK-65  
 2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 400 20mm  
 2 F-100 8 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2 LAU-3  
 3 F-100 12 MK-82  
 2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 2 750 NAP / 2 LAU-3  
 3 F-100 6 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2 LAU-3 / 2400 20mm  
 3 F-100 8 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP  
 2 F-100 6 M-116 / 2 750 NAP  
 3 F-100 6 M-117 / 6 750 NAP  
 4 F-4C 12 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 4 LAU-3 / 4400 20mm  
 3 F-100 8 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1800 20mm

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2 F-100	4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1200 20mm
2 F-100	4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1600 20mm
2 F-100	1 M-117 / 2 750 NAP (Due to weather)
2 F-100	6 MK-82 / 2 LAU-3
3 F-100	6 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2 LAU-3
2 F-100	8 MK-82
3 F-100	6 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2 LAU-3
2 F-100	4 MK-82 / 2 750 NAP / 2 LAU-3
2 F-100	4 MK-82 / 2 750 NAP / 2 LAU-3
3 F-100	8 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2 LAU-3
3 F-100	6 MK-82 / 2 750 NAP
3 F-100	6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP
3 F-100	6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP
*2 F-100	6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP
	4 M-117

\* Skyspot missions.

(4) Employment and Results: All but four missions flown in support of the 3rd Squadron were executed by Blackhorse FAC. Increasing inclement weather necessitated the use of low level delivered ordnance; e.g., MK-82 high frags, napalm, and 20mm. Although the MK-82 bomb (500#) is not as effective as the M-117 (750#) bomb the tactical aircraft were able to deliver much more ordnance on targets in weather which would have been prohibitive to the larger type ordnance. The bomb damage assessment (BDA) indicates that more reliable intelligence is still badly needed.

## (a) Recap of ordnance delivered.

MK-65	1000# BOMBS	- 3
M-117	750# BOMBS	- 17
MK-82	500# BOMBS	- 218
MK-81	250# BOMBS	- 16
BLU-3 or BLU-27	750# NAPALM BOMB	- 110
LAU-3 RX PODS	(19 RX/POD)	- 22
Flares		- 149
20mm Rounds		- 25,300
7.62mm Rounds		- 41,000

## (b) Bomb damage assessment (post strike mission report).

KBA - Confirmed - 17 / possible - 22

Bunkers or foxholes destroyed, damaged or uncovered - 6

Trenches destroyed, damaged or uncovered - 190

Secondary fires - 10

Trails uncovered - 400 meters

## g. Civic Action / Psychological Warfare.

(1) Civic Action: During Operation AARON, the 3rd Squadron conducted MEDCAPS at CAM MY (YS 462925) and AP HOUNG SA (YS 484810). A total of 134 patients were treated. In addition, using commodities provided by the regiment, the 3rd Squadron donated 1,200 lbs of rice, 952 lbs of powdered milk, 72 gallons of cooking oil, 700 lbs of corn meal, 1200 lbs of rolled wheat, 900 lbs of bulgar wheat and 50 lbs of assorted candy to needy people in the CAM MY area. With voluntary contributions from members of the 3rd Squadron, a television set was purchased and donated to the people of CAM MY. A television antenna was also provided and erected by the 3rd Squadron.

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(2) PSYOPS activities: PSYOPS support to the operation consisted of a total of twelve loudspeaker - leaflet missions during which 1,388,000 leaflets were dropped. Eight types of leaflets were dropped. A total of twelve special tapes were used during 8 hours and 10 minutes of speaker time. The basic themes of the tapes included curfew instructions, rally instructions, warnings to the VC that they would be defeated, exploitation of VC homesickness, and the publicizing of the 969 Reward for Information Program.

(3) Observations: The good will generated by the active CA/PSYOP program during Operation AKRON was clearly demonstrated by a farewell banquet held by the people of CAM MY for the commander and staff of the 3rd Squadron shortly after the conclusion of AKRON. The squadron S-3, who directed much of the CA/PSYOP operations in the operational area, received special recognition by the people.

## 7. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

### a. Anticipated enemy situation:

(1) At present, no major VC Main Force units are known to be occupying the area of operations. Elements of the 84th Rear Service Group and local units can be expected to be encountered throughout the area of operations and to oppose our movement with sniping, mines, and limited defensive action, especially in the area of stores and caches. Main force units could reoccupy the area without warning prior to our movement into the area of operations. All likely avenues of approach for armored vehicles, to include main roads, are expected to be mined. 5th VC Division can be expected to counter-sweep, either by attacking forward bases in the area of operations, or by attacking friendly installations or convoys outside the area of operations.

### (2) Order of Battle:

#### (a) Composition and disposition:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVAL</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
5th Div HQ	500	YS6084	26 May	A-2	
5th Div Fwd CP	Unk	YS6392	31 May	A-3	
274th Regt (-)	1300	YS6479	3 Jun	A-3	
1/274	350	YT5704	31 May	F-3	
275th Regt	1100 (?)	Unloc vic YS6293			
89th AA Gp	550	Unloc			Prob w/5th Div HQ
84th Rear Svc Gp	1350	YS4784	6 Apr	C-3	HQ only
D445 LF Bn (-)	300	YS5460	28 May	F-2	
C3/D445	100	Unloc vic YS2677		F-3	
C240 LF Co	120	YS2890	22 May	F-2	
C20 LF Co	Unk	Unloc vic YS4084			CHAU DUC Dist Co

#### (b) Strength:

1. Committed Forces: Within the area of operations, elements of Group 84, the C240 LF Company, the C20 LF Company, and C3/D445 must be considered immediately available for employment. It is also possible that an NVA replacement unit of up to battalion size could be encountered on its way through the area to reinforce the 5th VC Division.

2. Reinforcements: The 5th VC Division, with the 274th and 275th Regiments, can be committed in the eastern portion of the area of operation within 24 hours after commencing movement. It is also possible that the 274th could reoccupy its old bases in the MAT DICH prior to the initiation of Operation AKRON. If the multiplicity of agent reports of NVA regiments and battalions have

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any foundation, it is possible that an NVA battalion or regiment could also be committed within 24 hours. However, no NVA regiments are believed to be in the 5th Division area, although a battalion size nucleus for the yet to be formed third regiment may be present. In addition to known 5th Division elements, the D445 LF battalion (-) could move into the area of operation in 24 to 48 hours.

3 Personnel: The 5th Division is at about 40% strength overall. This is mainly due to the lack of a third regiment. However, both remaining regiments are understrength. The 274th, the stronger of the two, has about 65% of the TOE strength of 2500. The 275th is considerably lower, probably around 40%. Divisional support elements are believed to be better off, probably around 80% TOE strength. The major local force unit in the area of interest, the D445 LF battalion of PHUOC TUY Province, is well up to strength with approximately 400 men.

4 Equipment: The Soviet-CHICOM family of weapons is now found throughout the 5th Division. No rockets or heavy mortars have been confirmed, although the 89th AA Group reportedly has two 120mm mortars. A rallier report of one quad mounted 12.7mm HMG within the division has not yet been confirmed. A minor chemical capability does exist in that manpacked flamethrowers are found in a chemical platoon under division control. One such weapon was captured from 2/275 in March.

(c) Tactics: From prior experience during probes into the HAT DICH area, the VC can be expected to defend their base camps by the extensive use of mines, sniping and RPG-2's. Any main force units encountered can be expected to delay from prepared positions, using mortars and recoilless rifles, in addition to their normal complement of antitank and automatic weapons. The 5th Division can be expected to counter-sweep by either mounting diversionary attacks elsewhere or attacking the operational forces directly. Such attacks would normally be targeted against base camps, forward command posts or resupply convoys. A mortar/recoilless rifle attack can be considered the minimum to be expected with the possibility of a ground attack or ambush always present. The terrain along Interprovincial Route 2 and the covered approaches provide ample opportunity for employment of 5th Division forces.

(d) Training: As shown by the contacts the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has had with VC main force units, especially the 21 May ambush, the individual VC is a well trained, competently led, professional soldier. The recent influx of NVA units and fillers will further increase the already high state of training in the 5th VC Division.

(e) Logistics: Resupply of the 5th VC Division units is handled by the 84th Rear Service Group which operates throughout the area of operation as well as east to the MAY TAO mountain area. Services provided by the Group include quartermaster, transportation, ordnance, medical, production and finance. The main east-west supply route crosses Interprovincial Route 2 in the NGAI GIAO, XA BANG, Slope 30 area (Y44585).

(f) Combat efficiency: The 5th Division's efficiency as a division is questionable due to the lack of a third regiment and insufficient personnel in the other two regiments. The 275th in particular has a poor record, although it has still mounted battalion (-) operations such as GJM TUN on 6 May (ZS0182). In the LO GCM (Y35155) action of 20 March, the second battalion was reported to have been reduced to less than 100 men, and as a result disbanded. If this is true, the combat effectiveness of the 275 Regiment is about that of a full strength battalion. The 274 Regiment, although at less than full strength, is still an effective fighting force. It has a fine combat record, even against US troops. The 274th can be expected to put up strong resistance if engaged. The combat effectiveness of the local force units is generally unknown except for the D445 which is rated as fully combat effective.

#### 1. Actual enemy situation:

The intelligence estimates prepared for Operation KHAM proved to be accurate. Well prepared fortifications, small base camps and numerous bunkers, trenches and foxholes were found during the operation. For the most part, contacts with the VC were limited to small unit actions. The most significant engagement occurred in the morning of 19 June at 0115H when the 3rd Squadron command post with E Troop and

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3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company, located vicinity YS447825 sustained an intensive ground attack from an estimated reinforced VC battalion. The VC did not attempt to overrun the perimeter, but fired into it with small arms, machine guns, mortars, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, M-79 grenade launchers and heavy machineguns. Fire was returned with all organic weapons to include mortars and artillery, and LFT's and Air Force flare ships provided suppressive fires. The VC broke contact with the perimeter at 0200H and as they withdrew to the west they overran a K Troop patrol, vicinity YS447833 resulting in six US KHA from the patrol. Six VC bodies and numerous abandoned weapons were found near the patrol. During the attack, the M Company perimeter received an estimated eight rounds of mortar fire, vicinity YS445850. At first light, a search revealed forty-five VC bodies around the command post. Additional bodies were found east of Interprovincial Route 2 along the withdrawal route of the attacking VC force. A detailed study of the numerous documents found in the battle area indicate that the attack was probably mounted by the 2nd Battalion, 274th Regiment, with at least the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion and divisional artillery elements supporting. VC losses were fifty-six KIA (BC), two PW (WIA); one M-79 grenade launcher, one SKS carbine, four AK-47 assault rifles, five RPG-2 rocket launchers, one Type 50 SMG, one Type 56 CHICOM carbine, one M1 carbine, two BAR's, two Type 53 carbines, forty-two hand grenades and a large amount of ammunition captured.

c. Sources of information:

Various sources of information were utilized before and during Operation AKRON to collect information of Viet Cong activities. Preliminary estimates were prepared from Viet Cong installation lists, SPAR and other agent reports, Periodic Intelligence Reports (II FFORCE V), terrain studies, climatic weather studies and reports received through Vietnamese intelligence channels. Daily intelligence was obtained from interrogation reports and both ground and aerial surveillance and reconnaissance activities. Reconnaissance operations were supplemented by night vision devices. Captured enemy documents and other material were also helpful in providing information of the VC situation.

8. (C) MISSION.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) was to conduct reconnaissance and search and destroy operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, and to be prepared to provide security for engineer work forces in sector.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION.

a. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) conducts operation in two phases, utilizing two armored cavalry squadrons and available ARVN forces.

b. Phase I. 3rd Squadron conducts reconnaissance and search and destroy operations in coordination and cooperation with the 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) along Interprovincial Route 2 and in AO BOOT and AO SADDLE.

c. Phase II. Secures engineer clearing of Blackstone and Firestone Trails east of N-S grid line 37; continues reconnaissance and search and destroy operations in TAOR.

d. 1st Squadron continues Operation KITTY HAWK with security of the base camp and GIA RAY rock quarry and conducts ROAD RUNNER operations along National Highway 1; prepared to react with troop size reinforcement and prepares to secure engineer work parties along the Blackstone Trail east of N-S grid line 37.

10. (C) EXECUTION.

7 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK, securing the base camp and GIA RAY Rock Quarry, and conducting ROAD RUNNER operations between LONG BINH, GIA RAY, and the base camp.

3rd Squadron. Initiated Operation AKRON at 0600H with Troop K clearing Interprovincial Route 2 to vicinity YS458900. Troops I and L and Company M attacked to seize Objectives A (YS3987) and C (YS3986) (See Annex B). Upon seizure of objectives

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maneuver elements initiated search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE (See Annex A). No contact was made; squadron command post received one round sniper fire vicinity YS414876 resulting in negative casualties.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued to support operations, providing light fire team cover.

10 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE. Troop A to seize Objectives B (YS3785) and D (YS3985). Troop I located one VC KIA (K) vicinity YS412881; captured one MAS-36 bolt action rifle vicinity YS412884. Troop E located and destroyed a base camp containing 105 bunkers vicinity YS388857. Troop L destroyed a base camp containing twenty bunkers vicinity YS375847 at 1305H. At 1318H the troop destroyed a trench bunker complex 100 meters long with 100 bunkers vicinity YS377849.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Became direct support at 1000H and moved by foot into AO BOOT at 1145H.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

11 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE. Troop K evacuated six tons (100 lb bags) of polished rice and 1600 pounds of salt vicinity YS388858 at 0830H. Company M captured one detainee vicinity YS437865 with CHICOM grenade at 0930H; at 1145H evacuated 2.75 tons polished rice vicinity YS438802. Destroyed 300 - 400 meters trench (YS431869) and evacuated 1600 pounds of rice at 1350H.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued search and destroy operations in AO BOOT without incident.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

12 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE. Troop L engaged and killed one VC (EC) vicinity YS448848 at 1600H; at 1604H an ACAV received RPG-2 fire resulting in moderate damage; one US KIA, three US WHA and one National Policeman WHA. Artillery supported with unknown results. At 1650H vicinity YS438848 received two rifle grenades and sporadic small arms fire with negative result. Troop K destroyed base camp containing twenty bunkers vicinity YS371848 at 1420H; destroyed thirty-seven bunkers vicinity YS362848. Company M evacuated 1.5 tons polished rice and destroyed forty-five fortifications vicinity YS423856. At 1915H an ACAV hit a mine vicinity YS440850 leaving a crater 2x2x6 feet long and resulting in damage to the suspension system; four US WHA; engaged one VC with unknown results.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO BOOT. Located a base camp vicinity YS373885 at 1427H consisting of fifty bunkers, thirty mortar rounds, 2150 rounds of small arms, fifty rounds M79, 20 lbs TNT, seventy-two mortar fuzes, and twenty non-electric blasting caps.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

13 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE. Troop I destroyed base camp consisting of twenty bunkers, three kitchen huts; captured a DH-18 Claymore, two CHICOM grenades, and one rifle vicinity YS436848. Troop L destroyed base camp con-

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taining twenty-three military structures.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued search of base camp located 12 June vicinity YS375885. Destroyed additional ninety bunkers and six 82mm mortar rounds.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations. LRRP engaged and killed one VC (BC) vicinity YS525963 at 1730H; captured one M79 with seven rounds, one claymore, one US web belt, one US knife and one US canteen.

14 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK. Troop C secured Engineer Rome Plow parties in zone along the Blackstone Trail.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE and conducted Eagle Flights. Troop I at 0800H, uncovered a bunker complex containing twelve 5x4x4 foot bunkers, one medical hut with syringe, one hand grenade, one canteen, and nine flashlight batteries, vicinity YS426851. The bunkers were destroyed and all other items were evacuated. At 0930H, Troop K found one bunker and two tunnels containing cooking pots and clothing vicinity YS434844. Emplacements were destroyed. At 1450H, 2.2 tons of rice (YS468835) was captured and evacuated.

3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company. located, vicinity YS452834, one M1A1 mine and destroyed it in place.

15 June

1st Squadron (-). Continued Operation KITTY HAWK. Troop C continued security of Engineer Rome Plow parties along the Blackstone Trail.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE. Command post received ten rounds of small arms fire vicinity YS447837 at 0833H; there were no casualties. Troop K destroyed a base camp containing thirty-three bunkers and three CBU vicinity YS405825 at 1235H. A tank with Troop L sustained minor damage from an antitank mine vicinity YS438850 at 0823H; there were no casualties.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Moved overland from AO BOOT to vicinity YS460835.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

16 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK and security of Rome Plow parties along the Blackstone Trail.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE and conducted Eagle Flights in area of operations without achieving significant contact. Troop K found and destroyed fifteen bunkers vicinity YS408823. One bunker contained one VC gas mask made from a plastic bag and bloody rags.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Conducted operations in AO RANGER (See Annex C) without contact.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

17 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE and RANGER without contact. Troop I conducted search and destroy operations in Area 38 (See Annex D). At 1435H, the troop destroyed fifteen bunkers, fifteen CBU's and three pounds of clothing vicinity YS400800. Troop K searched Area 65 and at 1430H destroyed one CHICOM grenade (YS411826). At 1435H one CBU was found and destroyed vicinity YS412826. Two long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP) inserted into AO MIKE (See Annex E) at 0900H.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO RANGER without contact

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Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations. LRRP were inserted into AO MIKE at 0900H; one patrol engaged seven VC vicinity YS497836 resulting in five VC KIA (BC) at 1745H. Both patrols were extracted without incident.

18 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations conducting search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE and RANGER. Attached engineer platoon developed stream crossings in Area 40. Command post displaced to YS448826, closing at 1430H. Troop I searched in Area 38 and at 0805H destroyed a CBU bomblet rigged with a claymore vicinity YS413824. At 1010H destroyed two well fortified bunkers, 300 meters of trench and one messhall (YS398812). Troop L conducted search and destroy activities in Area 33. At 0815H, elements of the troop located an abandoned village vicinity YS430813 which appeared to have been occupied the previous night. At 0920H, found abandoned village (YS425829) with indications 2-4 persons had occupied the area. At 0930H, the troop uncovered a platoon sized encampment vicinity YS425815 with markings indicating the area was booby-trapped and mined. Six foxholes and five L-shaped mortar emplacements were also located in the same area. At 1545H, elements of the troop found a battalion sized assembly area including fresh foxholes, footpaths and VC leaflets.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO RANGER.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

19 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE and RANGER. At 0115H, elements of the 1st Battalion, 274th VC Regiment launched a mortar, recoilless rifle and ground attack against the command post defended by Troop K. Light fire teams, artillery, and flareships supported with contact broken at 0210H. VC losses were fifty-six VC KIA (BC), two PW, seventeen detainees, thirteen weapons, five RPG-2 launchers, assorted types of grenades, recoilless rifle rounds and small arms ammunition captured; US losses were nine KHA, thirty-two WHA, one AVLB and six ACaV's damaged. The squadron (-) conducted sweep of the area west of Interprovincial Route 2 without contact. (See Annex H for detailed account of the attack and subsequent actions initiated by the reaction forces.)

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Was extracted from vicinity YS448826 by CH-47, extraction completed 1005H.

3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry (-). Became OPCON to the regiment at 0854H and assisted in sweep operations south of the Courtenay Rubber Plantation. At 1440H, Troop A engaged unknown number of VC vicinity YS520884, artillery, light fire teams, and air strikes supported with unknown results. There were two WHA and one ACaV damaged. At 1530H Troop C found eight bodies (VC KIA (BC)) in fresh graves. Bodies and graves less than 12 hours old, killed by small arms and fragments vicinity YS484864.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations and 3rd Squadron engagement with elements of 274th VC Regiment.

20 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE conducting saturation patrolling without contact.

3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry (-). Continued search and destroy operations south of the Courtenay Plantation without contact. At 1514H, elements of the squadron uncovered a base camp 100x200 meters with bunkers. Airstrikes were employed against the camp producing five secondary brush fires. Reverted to 9th Infantry Division control at 1706H.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations, conducting surveillance of the area of operations and provided light fire team support for the squadron.

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21 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE. At 1034H, 3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company received three rounds sniper fire vicinity YS450905; the area was searched with negative results.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Became direct support to the regiment at 0734H and moved south from the base camp to AO LION (See Annex F).

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

22 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron (-). Continued operations in AO SADDLE. Troop I conducted cordon and search of LANG LOM vicinity YS455885 without incident. Troop K provided direct support for the 52nd Ranger Battalion in AO LION. Troop L secured Engineer Rome Flow parties along the Firestone Trail.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Commenced search and destroy operations in AO LION with Troop K providing direct support. Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery provided supporting fires from vicinity CAM MY.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations and provided three Eagle Flights to 3rd Squadron. At 1900H found 1/2 lb of documents and 5 lbs of medical supplies; destroyed structure vicinity YS458890.

23 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron (-). Continued operations in AO SADDLE. Troop I conducted cordon and search and MEDCAP vicinity XA BONG (YS467858); treated eighty patients. Troop K continued direct support of 52nd Ranger Battalion. Troop L continued security of engineer work parties. Company M destroyed 300 meters of trench and seventy-five reinforced bunkers vicinity YS380840 at 1415H.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO LION without contact.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations; provided three Eagle Flights to 3rd Squadron.

24 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron (-). Continued operations in AO SADDLE; conducted MEDCAP at CAM MY treating 200 patients. Troop K continued direct support to 52nd Ranger Battalion. Troop L continued security of engineer work parties along Firestone Trail. Company I located base camp consisting of 1200 meters of trenches and seventy-five reinforced bunkers vicinity YS388838 at 1000H. 3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company conducted mine sweeping operations along Interprovincial Route 2; located and destroyed nine mines vicinity YS458896.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO LION with Troop K. At 0910H, 3400 pounds of cement and seven gallons of cooking oil at YS515835 were found and evacuated.

25 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy, cordon and search, MEDCAP, mine sweeping and saturation patrolling in AO SADDLE. Troop I conducted search and destroy operations in Areas 19, 24, and 13 (See Annex G). At 1130H, fourteen detainees were evacuated to DUC THAM district headquarters from the area of YS5457839 and YS458837. Troop K secured pickup zone (PZ) for extraction of 52nd Ranger Battalion and conducted

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Gordon and search of AP HUONG SA (YS483812). Apprehended three male detainees who were evacuated to DUC THAN and conducted a MEDCO treating fifty patients. Troop L continued security of Rome Flow parties along the Firestone Trail. Company M completed destruction of base camp found on 24 June. At 0740H the troop found and destroyed a US hand grenade rigged for immediate detonation when the pin was removed vicinity YS415875.

2nd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company. Swept Interprovincial Route 2 for mines south from YS458896. At 1630H, two antitank mines were located (YS454867) and destroyed. One was an RPG-2 rigged as a mine.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Was extracted by CH-47 from PZ vicinity YS525840; extraction completed at 1120H.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

27 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK. At 1917H, the squadron (-) moved to reinforce the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) in contact with the 3rd Battalion, 275th VC Regiment vicinity AP PHU CAT (YT3231).

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SDDLE. Commenced extraction from operational area. Troop L was relieved of security for engineer work parties along the Firestone Trail at 0700H by elements of the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mech). All elements closed the base camp at 1653H.

### 11. (C) RESULTS.

#### a. Enemy Losses:

##### (1) Personnel:

65 VC KIA (BC), 3 PW, 1 HOI CHANH, 51 Detainees.

##### (2) Fortifications and buildings:

44 military structures and 661 fortifications destroyed.

##### (3) Materiel (captured and destroyed):

20 small arms weapons, 12,335 small arms rounds, 20 lbs TNT captured, 124 artillery rounds, 13 mines, and 58 grenades destroyed.

##### (4) Foodstuffs:

14.3 tons rice, 0.8 tons salt, and 7 gallons cooking oil.

##### (5) Miscellaneous:

5 lbs documents, 5 lbs medical supplies, 2 bicycles, 1.7 tons of cement.

#### b. Friendly Losses:

##### (1) Personnel:

10 KIA, 52 WIA.

##### (2) Material:

1 AVLB, 1 M58A3, 7 ACAV's damaged.

c. Followup action by friendly ground forces continues to be hampered by the difficulty of cross country movement. Whenever a target area is reasonably accessible immediate reaction is initiated; however the percentage still remains relatively low.

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12. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. Logistics.

(1) Resupply:

(a) Method of Operation.

During Operation AKRON, the regiment was under the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division and received logistical support from the Blackhorse Base Camp (LONG GIAO) supply facilities. The 3rd Squadron with attached units was the principal recipient of the support. The 551st Light Maintenance Company and the 506th Supply and Service Company which are located in the base camp and the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Class V point at LONG BINH, provided the support for the operation through the base camp facilities. Resupply to the forward areas was accomplished by the use of CH-47 and UH-1D helicopters while wheeled vehicles moved the items from the depots to the base camp.

The squadron trains remained at LONG GIAO; wheeled vehicles were dispatched to pick-up Class I - IV supplies and repair parts from the 506th Supply and Service Company and the 551st Light Maintenance Company respectively for transportation to the squadron trains area. At this point they were prepared for aerial movement (slung loaded) to the forward area on CH-47 helicopters. Class V supplies were moved overland from LONG BINH to LONG GIAO by organic 5 ton trucks and trucks from the 709th Transportation Battalion.

(b) Consumption data (transported by CH-47).

Unit	Sorties	Class III (gal)	Class V (lbs)	Class I (C Rations)	Water (gal)
HHT	14	2860	750	308 cases	5600
Trp I	42	7400	34600	282 cases	5600
Trp K	42	9790	34250	463 cases	6400
Trp L	42	9515	49300	390 cases	6400
Co M	42	13840	25525	365 cases	5600
How Btry	28	1555	206500	26 cases	4000
Mort Btry	18	1100	151000	98 cases	
B-7-9 Arty	10		33000		1200
Totals	238	43605 gallons	534925 lbs (217.41 tons)	1932 cases	34800 gallons

(2) Maintenance: Operation AKRON continued to show the value of logistical support by air. As in other operations repair parts were airlifted to field locations. Major assemblies were also moved the same way accompanied by maintenance contact teams. Major assemblies replaced during the operation included two M48A3 engines, three M113 engines, three M48A3 transmissions, five M48A3 final drives and three M113 final drives. A total of six M48A3 tanks were deadlined for major components and all but two were repaired within 36 hours in the field. The remaining two were evacuated to the 551st Light Maintenance Company at the base camp for 3rd echelon repairs. Eleven armored personnel carriers (M113) were deadlined during the operation; two of them were evacuated to the 551st Light Maintenance Company for repair.

(3) Treatment and evacuation of casualties: Casualties incurred during Operation AKRON were light with the vast majority of them occurring on 19 June as the result of the VC attack on the 3rd Squadron Command Post. Backup medical support for the squadron was provided by the 24th and 93rd Evacuation Hospital in LONG BINH and the 7th Surgical Hospital and 37th Medical Company in the base camp.

e. Communications: Operation AKRON was unique to the regiment, in that the regimental headquarters remained in the base camp and thus was able to take advantage of all base camp communications facilities.

(1) Preliminary Plans: Very little preplanning was necessary as the regiment had already received VHF and communications center support from the 9th Signal Battalion, 9th Infantry Division. In addition, communications had been previously established in the 9th Division FM and AM radio nets.

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## (2) Communications to higher headquarters:

(a) FM - Prior to the beginning of Operation AKRON the regiment was already operating in the 9th Infantry Division CG Command Net and the Intelligence Net, with no difficulties encountered.

(b) AM - The regiment entered the Division Operations/Intelligence AM RATT Net prior to Operation AKRON, therefore traffic was already being passed before the operation commenced.

(3) Communications from the base camp: Since the regimental command post did not displace from the base camp, normal base camp facilities were fully utilized. Continuous radio contact was maintained with the operating squadrons, plus attached units, throughout the operation.

## (4) Radio nets and telephone-teletype circuits utilized:

### (a) Radio Nets:

1 FM - Normal regimental FM nets were employed as well as entry into the 9th Infantry Division nets (see Appendix 1 to Annex I).

2 AM-AM RATT - contact was maintained in the 9th Division Operations/Intelligence Net (see Appendix 2 to Annex I).

### (b) Telephone Circuits:

1 Common User - Normal base camp common user circuits were maintained and utilized. In addition, common user circuits were established to the Reliable Main switchboard (see Appendix 3 to Annex I).

2 Sole User - Sole user telephone circuits were established between the regimental TOC and the 9th Division TOC. These consisted of G-3/S-3 TOC, G-3 Air/S-3 Air, and an Artillery Coordination circuit. In addition, a sole user circuit from the regimental TOC to the 1st Australian Task Force TOC was re-established (see Appendix 3 to Annex I).

(c) Teletypewriter Circuits: The normal base camp teletypewriter circuit was utilized for everyday administrative and logistic traffic. A separate tactical teletype circuit was established between the regimental command post and the 9th Division, providing a quick reaction, secure, page copy capability.

## d. Administration:

(1) General. The administrative plan utilized during Operation AKRON was essentially the same as when search and destroy operations are conducted by the squadrons in the regiment's TACR. Since regimental headquarters remained in base camp no necessity existed for administrative personnel to move to a field location. No administrative difficulties developed during the operation.

## (2) Casualties:

### US Losses:

Killed by Hostile Action	10
Wounded by Hostile Action	52
Missing by Hostile Action	0
Non Battle Dead	0
Non Battle Injured	1

## (3) Personnel Services:

(a) Religious. Services were conducted with a total attendance of 894 for personnel of all faiths.

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(b) Special Services. No special services activities were conducted in the field.

(c) Post Exchange. Post exchange facilities were not available to units involved in the operation. Existing base camp facilities were available and utilized when the situation permitted.

## 13. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.

The regiment employed no special equipment or techniques during Operation AKRON.

## 14. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS.

Operation AKRON, as did Operations JUNCTION CITY I and MANHATTAN, proved to be a successful operation not only from the standpoint of casualties inflicted on the enemy, but also the number of base areas denied him. For the first time, the enemy chose to engage armored cavalry forces of the 3rd Squadron in a night attack; otherwise, the enemy fought limited engagements. The attack upon the 3rd Squadron Command Post on the morning of 19 June was successfully defended by Troop K and 3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company with few casualties; five of the nine KHA were sustained as the Viet Cong withdrew and overran a ten man ambush patrol. Casualties along the perimeter were minimal due to the armor protection, despite massive fires from enemy mortars, recoilless rifles, RPG-2's, and heavy machine guns.

The base area denial effort was accomplished with minimal delay; the extensive use of engineer support to develop landing zones and lines of communication through the jungle made the enemy aware that his own safe havens were in jeopardy. For future operations, however, it is quite apparent that the VC will seed the trails with mines. These mines will not stop armored cavalry forces, but will require tedious mine sweeping operations, thus enabling the enemy to escape through hidden jungle trails. In order to complete base area denial, jungle clearing operations must be intensified to compartmentize the jungle into pockets of four to six kilometers square. When enemy battalions are being pursued, they are forced into an area that is clearly defined; attempts to flee across jungle fire trails can be easily observed and interdicted by close air and gunship support.

## 15. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

### (a) Item: Mutually supporting artillery.

Discussion: The enemy has repeatedly directed massive ground attacks against command posts and fire support patrol bases.

Observation: Fire support patrol bases should be within mutual supporting range of 105mm or 155mm artillery.

### (b) Item: Protective cover at night defensive positions.

Discussion: During mortar or ground attacks, a large number of casualties are sustained due to failure to utilize existing protective cover.

Observation: Armor vehicle protection should be utilized while sleeping. At a minimum, sleeping areas should have boms level with individual sleeping; overhead protection is desired.

### (c) Item: Ambush patrol and listening post briefing.

Discussion: During the attack on 19 June, ambush patrols were cut-off by the enemy and pinned down by enemy and friendly fire.

Observation: Patrols and listening posts should be briefed prior to their departure on alternate positions, routes of withdrawal, and actions to be taken if the parent unit comes under attack.

### (d) Item: Employment of Seismic Anti-Intrusion Devices.

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Discussion: During the attack on 19 June the anti-intrusion devices did not provide early warning of the impending attack. The motion pick-up transducers were employed at a range of 100 meters from the perimeter, however, the enemy attack was initiated from a range of 150 meters.

Observation: Consideration must be given to terrain, weather and the potential enemy threat in order to properly emplace the motion pick-up transducers. It should be placed at a sufficient range to pick up movement before an enemy attack begins. It must, therefore, be beyond the point at which the enemy would launch an attack.

(c) Item: Eagle Flight.

Discussion: Eagle Flights consisting of an airmobile squad in two UH-1D aircraft escorted by a light fire team were employed in open areas to approach suspicious personnel by moving in rapidly and capturing civilians for immediate interrogation by National Police who accompany the airmobile squad.

Observation: This tactic has proven valuable and has produced a considerable amount of enemy intelligence. If the Eagle Flights are used frequently they can effectively deny the enemy use of open areas in the daylight hours and hamper their supply and communications activities.

(f) Item: Tactical airstrikes.

Discussion: Prisoners of war and Hoi Chanh's have stated that tactical airstrikes are relatively ineffective due to the amount of time the FAC normally spends over the target prior to a strike. The VC are usually able to clear a strike area before the first bombs are dropped.

Observation: Airstrike effectiveness can be improved by:

(1) Reducing the target identification time by marking the target with artillery when the fighters are ready to start the strike.

(2) Employ "Dry Run" airstrikes on an extensive basis, by having a FAC go through pre-strike maneuvers to include marking a target, but not bringing in an actual strike. This would confuse the enemy as to when an airstrike would actually take place and also harass him considerably, since he moves whenever a FAC circles an area in preparation for a strike.

ANNEX A and APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX I withdrawn, HQ, DA


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OPORD 11-67 (Opn AKRON) 3-11 Armd Cav Regt - Reference maps, VIETNAM  
1:50,000, Series L7011, Sheets 63301, II, III; 64301, II, III, IV.



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
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FRAGORD 4, Operations Overlay (Area of Operations - RANGER)- Reference maps, VIETNAM 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6330I, II, III; 6430I, II, III, IV.




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ANNEX C

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Series L7014, Sheets 6330 I, II, III, 6430 I, II, III, IV.



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
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FRAGORD 5, Operations Overlay (Area of Operations - MIKE)- Reference  
VIETNAM 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6330I, II, III; 6430 I, II, III,  
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
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FRAGORD 7, Operations Overlay (Area of Operations - LION) - Reference maps, VIETNAM 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6330 I, II, III; 6430 I, II, III, IV.





ANNEX F

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OPORD 11467 (Operation AKRON) 3-11 Armd Cav Regt - Reference maps, VIETNAM 1:50,000;  
Series L7014, Sheets 6330I, II, III; 6430 I, II, III, IV.



ANNEX 6

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### BATTLE OF SLOPE 30

On 19 June 1967, the 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, defeated a major Viet Cong force composed of two infantry battalions of the 274th Main Force Regiment, reinforced by heavy weapons elements from the regiment and the 5th Viet Cong Division. The enemy had attacked elements of the Squadron near SLOPE 30 Hamlet, located 30 kilometers east of Saigon.

SLOPE 30 Hamlet has long been a bastion of Viet Cong domination in northern PHOUIC TUY Province. It sits astride Interprovincial Route 2, the last line of communication available to the Viet Cong between the HAM DICH Secret Zone to the west of the highway and the MAY TAO Secret Zone located to the east. As the focal point of Viet Cong activity in the area, it provides not only a secure haven for enemy forces negotiating the province but also serves as the center for supplying these troops and the local Viet Cong from nearby base camps. The hamlet is bordered by a narrow strip of cultivated fields and rubber and coffee plantations. Beyond this lie the primary forests and jungle.

Prior to the Battle of SLOPE 30, the 3rd Squadron participated in the 9th Infantry Division's multi-battalion OPERATION AKHON, initiated 9 June 1967. The objectives of this operation were the destruction of enemy forces and installations in the Viet Cong Secret Zone called the HAM DICH. Concurrently, a major engineering effort was directed toward the establishment of jungle-free east-west and north-south lines of communication to facilitate future reentry and exploration of this long-time Viet Cong sanctuary.

Initially the 3rd Squadron pushed deep into the primary forest from the eastern sector of the area of operation. As the search progressed, the squadron moved south, reaching the vicinity of SLOPE 30 Hamlet on 18 June 1967. In late afternoon on the 18th, the squadron pulled out of the forest and established troop-sized defensive positions in the relatively open area to the north and east of SLOPE 30 Hamlet. By 2000 hours listening posts, ambush patrols, and anti-intrusion devices had been placed outside each perimeter, and defensive concentrations had been fired. The disposition of the squadron at this point is shown in Inclosure 1. For the next five hours the jungle quiet was interrupted only by a suspected enemy movement north of the Team K position at 2200 hours and by the harassing and interdicting fires conducted by the Howitzer and Provisional Mortar Batteries.

Suddenly, at 0110 hours on the 19th, the Viet Cong unleashed a violent assault upon the squadron position. Team M with the Provisional Mortar Battery, and Team K with the Command Post, Howitzer Battery, and 3/919 Engineer Company were hit simultaneously with mortar fire (Inclosure 2). The fire directed at Team M and the Provisional Mortar Battery was apparently designed to destroy the firing capability of the Mortar Battery and to create a diversion from the main attack. While sustaining this barrage for almost thirty minutes, the northerners never faltered; they began a fire mission which would last for over an hour. Throughout the mission, key personnel remained exposed to call fire commands and to replace aiming stakes which were unharmed by the enemy's attack.

The attack on the Team K perimeter was obviously not a diversionary tactic. In addition to a mortar barrage, the enemy struck with two main force battalions of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment reinforced by heavy weapons elements of the Regiment and 5th Viet Cong Division. The attackers were armed with unusually large numbers of anti-tank and automatic weapons. They used these weapons initially to deliver a withering fire on the northern sector of the perimeter, followed shortly by successive attacks on the eastern and southern sectors. The latter two attacks were later found to be secondary efforts as the main force was positioned on the northern sector of the perimeter.

In the initial burst of fire, the northeast sector of the perimeter, including 1st Platoon of the 919th Engineer Company, was hit severely. Men who were blown or knocked from their machinegun positions on the Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAV) staggered to resume their positions. If too severely wounded, they were immediately replaced by volunteers from the inner perimeter. ACAV's that caught fire were saved by officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men from Team K, the command post, and the engineers, who moved from vehicle to vehicle using any available means to extinguish the blaze. These same men repeatedly entered the burning vehicles to evacuate personnel, equipment, and ammunition. While rescue and evacuation measures are under way, officers from the inner perimeter directed their ACAV's from this

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less critical area to the threatened northern sector. In some cases, ACAV commanders, upon seeing flank vehicles receive hits, moved their ACAVs to an exposed position to cover the evacuation of the wounded from the damaged ACAVs and to cover the newly exposed sectors of the perimeter. Once replacement ACAVs were moved into the breach, they returned to their original positions.

Recovering quickly from the initial shock of the assault, the defenders countered with a devastating volume of automatic weapon and 90mm cannon fire which continued for the next hour and twenty minutes. The return fire was so well directed that the fire initiative passed into friendly hands at this point, never to be relinquished. Less than two minutes after the enemy initiated his attack, the Provisional Mortar Battery fired illumination in support of the Team K perimeter. This was followed by high explosive and illumination directed to the rubber plantation due east of the perimeter. Following these initial volleys, the fire was walked through the coffee plantation and the jungle to the south of the perimeter. At the same time, the Howitzer Battery initiated a counter-mortar fire plan in support of Provisional Mortar Battery. At 0135 hours, a flareship from the US 7th Tactical Air Force arrived on station to provide continuous illumination until first light in the morning. This action enabled the mortars to shift to purely defensive fires.

A short time later, a light fire team from the regiment's Air Cavalry Troop arrived over the battlefield to provide surveillance of enemy routes of reinforcement or withdrawal. At this time the enemy's main attack was still directed toward the north. After the location of the ambush patrol in that area was reaffirmed, the light fire team was directed to engage the enemy firing from the rubber tree line just north of the perimeter. This was an extremely hazardous assignment since it called for the team to make its firing pass from west to east, directly into the trajectory of the mortar rounds falling on the enemy to the east of the perimeter. This maneuver succeeded in appreciably decreasing the enemy fire. Upon completion of the firing mission the light fire team jettisoned its rocket pods and voluntarily landed within the Team K perimeter to evacuate the first group of seriously wounded.

When the light fire team departed, an Air Force "Puff the Magic Dragon" arrived on station and interdicted possible enemy positions and routes of withdrawal to the south of the perimeter. As one aircraft expended its ordnance, another relieved it. This firing was followed by 8 inch howitzer and 175mm gun support from Battery A, 1st Battalion, 93rd Artillery, firing from the 1st Australian Task Force Base Camp to the south at NUI DAT. This ordnance was directed toward enemy routes of withdrawal to the south and east.

During the course of the action, the three ambush patrols and two listening posts were ordered to remain in position since they were caught in an intense cross fire. When a lull in the firing appeared, the listening posts fought a delaying action back to the perimeter. Ambush Patrol Two was not effected by the fire and remained in position to monitor the open flank to the west. Ambush Patrol Three was pinned down and could not move. Within minutes a six ACAV volunteer force moved out from the Team K perimeter, fought their way to the patrol, and conducted a withdrawal to the perimeter, suffering no casualties. Prior to the withdrawal, one patrol member had been killed and two wounded.

Ambush Patrol One, with one non-commissioned officer and nine enlisted men remained in position throughout the attack. They had maintained contact with the main force throughout the battle but enemy movement between their position and the perimeter was noted, and they held fast. They were not detected until the Viet Cong began their withdrawal from the battle area. In the ensuing fight, they were quickly overrun by a frenzied enemy, throwing grenades and firing automatic weapons. Five patrol members were killed and four wounded. Six Viet Cong bodies were found. When the Team K commander lost contact with the patrol, he dispatched a volunteer armored relief force which searched until 0310 hours before the survivors were found and evacuated.

At 0220 hours the enemy began to retreat. It was initially believed that the enemy was moving to the northwest, and interdictory fires were directed on routes of withdrawal in the area. Additionally, Team I was committed to pursue in that direction. Subsequently, a captured PW and Viet Cong operation order for the attack indicated that the main effort would withdraw to the east toward Interprovincial Route 2 and ultimately toward the MAY TAO Secret Zone. At this time Team K was ordered to

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start a detailed search of the battlefield, while Teams I and W initiated pursuit to the east. When Team I uncovered little or no evidence of the enemy activity to the northwest, they were also committed to the pursuit to the east. Contact was not regained; however, numerous blood-stained trails were discovered in addition to eight abandoned bodies. At the site of the battle, 48 Viet Cong dead were found; in addition, 2 wounded Viet Cong and numerous weapons were collected.

The litter of the battlefield and the enemy's disorganized retreat told the story of a stunning defeat delivered to a Viet Cong battalion specifically designed to be an armor-destroying force. The discipline, rapid reaction, and perseverance of the defenders had succeeded not only in blunting and repelling the attack but in holding the enemy at a range sufficient for the effective employment of indirect fire support. The squadron's pursuit of the enemy destroyed its efforts to regroup and to conduct an organized withdrawal. Subsequent intelligence reports gathered from agents the local population, and DUC THANH District indicated that large numbers of Viet Cong dead and wounded had been carried to the east and that a large number of the wounded had died in route.

Subsequent to the action of 19 June 1967, forces of the government of South Vietnam launched pacification in the SLOPE 30 area. The Battle of SLOPE 30 represent another chapter in the allied struggle to bring former Viet Cong strongholds under effective government control.

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## RESULTS OF THE ACTION

### 1. US LOSSES:

- a. KHA: 7 - K Trp, 3-11 Armd Cav  
2 - 3rd Platoon, 919th Engr Co
- b. WHA: 1 - HHT, 3-11 Armd Cav  
4 - HOW, 3-11 Armd Cav  
20 - K Trp, 3-11 Armd Cav  
9 - 3rd Platoon, 919th Engr Co
- c. ACAV's Damaged: 2 - K Trp, 3-11 Armd Cav  
2 - HHT, 3-11 Armd Cav  
2 - 3rd Platoon, 919th Engr Co

### 2. Enemy Losses

- a. KIA (BC) - 56
- b. KIA (Possible) - 150
- c. WIA (BC) - 2
- d. PW - 2
- e. WIA (Possible) - 200
- f. Captured Equipment:
  - (1) 5 RPG-2 Launchers
  - (2) 1 M79 Launcher
  - (3) 4 AK-47 Rifles
  - (4) 2 US B/R's
  - (5) 1 Chicom Type 50 SHG
  - (6) 1 Chicom Type 53 Carbine
  - (7) 2 Chicom Type 56 (SKS) Carbines
  - (8) 2 US M1 Carbines
  - (9) 122 Assorted Grenades
  - (10) 9 M79 rounds
  - (11) 250 rounds 12.7mm linked
  - (12) 1 Chicom night sight for recoilless rifle
  - (13) 5 75mm RR rounds
  - (14) 12 RPG-2 rockets
  - (15) 6 RPG-2 Boosters
  - (16) ground mount for 12.7mm AA MG
  - (17) 10,000 rounds assorted SA ammo
  - (18) 250 pounds of assorted individual equipment

### 2 Incl


- 1 - Operation Overlay
- 2 - Sketch of Situation

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Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:25,000 - Sheet 6430 III N.




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Operation AKRON  
FM Radio Nets




- 9th Division Command Net
- ⊕ 9th Division Intelligence Net
- ⊗ 11th Armored Cavalry Command Net
- ⊙ 11th Armored Cavalry Intelligence Net

Appendix 1 to Annex # I

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Operation A'RON  
AM RATT Net



 9th Division Operation Intelligence Net

Appendix 2 to Annex # I

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